The Invent and Invest Scam: How We Traced and Took Down a Site Copying Our Company

In September 2026 I found out that a website was pretending to be one of my companies. It used our real company name, our Companies House number, our registered address, and my name as its chief executive. A man in Poland had been talking to people from it about selling his property, and he travelled to Rome expecting to meet me. I had never heard of him.

In short

  • A fake website copied our company name, number, address and my name. Companies House details are public, so anyone can do this.
  • We saved proof of the site, found out which company was hosting it, and reported it with the evidence. It was suspended the next day, and Google removed it from its search results about ten days later.
  • Along the way we found our own website address had passed its renewal date six days earlier and was in the holding period. We renewed it that day.
  • Three things to do now: keep your domains on automatic renewal, search for your business name now and again, and say clearly on your website what you never do.

Below is exactly what we did, step by step. Each step starts in plain English, with the technical detail underneath for anyone who wants to repeat it.

The fake site

The fake was invent-and-invest.com, with hyphens. Our genuine company, INVENT AND INVEST (company number 04253863, registered in 2001), has always used inventandinvest.co.uk. I am not linking to the fake, and it no longer resolves anyway. These are from our evidence capture on 29 September 2026.

Home page of the fake invent-and-invest.com site, presenting itself as an investment firm in Warrington
The fake home page: "Pioneering Growth with Strategic Investments", located in Warrington. Invent and Invest does not make investments or take money from anyone.

The fake site's team page listing John Rowlinson as CEO with an email address on the fake domain

The team page listed me as CEO, with an address on their domain. Six more "staff" followed, each with a title and an email address.

Everything on Companies House is public: name, number, registered office, incorporation date and directors. Anyone who checked the fake against the register would find a perfect match. The register cannot tell you whether a website or an email domain belongs to the company, and that is the only question that matters.

Step 1: save the evidence before you report anything

Before telling anyone, save a dated copy of everything. Once you report a site, it can vanish, and then it is your word against nobody's. So before contacting anyone we captured each page five ways, at a recorded time (18:25 UTC on 29 September):

  • the raw HTML, saved with curl
  • the HTTP response headers, with curl -sI
  • a screenshot and a full-page PDF from headless Chromium
  • the domain's registration record from RDAP, as JSON
  • its A, NS and MX records from dig

We also saved our own Companies House record and officers list as PDFs, for comparison. Then every file went into a manifest with a SHA-256 hash:

sha256sum *.html *.pdf *.png *.txt *.json > manifest.txt

A hash cannot prove when or where a page was captured: that comes from the dated files, headers and records kept together. What it does show is that nothing has been changed since. If anyone later asks whether a file has been edited, the hash either matches or it does not.

Step 2: find out who runs the site

Next, find out which company registered the domain and which one hosts the website and email. They are the ones who can switch it off. The registration record is public: WHOIS is being replaced by RDAP, which returns it as structured data. For a .com, start at the Verisign registry:

curl -s https://rdap.verisign.com/com/v1/domain/invent-and-invest.com | jq

That showed the registrar as HOSTINGER operations, UAB (IANA registrar ID 1636), a registration date of 27 December 2024, and an abuse contact of abuse-tracker@hostinger.com. The owner's details were redacted, as they usually are now. Then the DNS:

dig +short A  invent-and-invest.com   →  195.200.9.138, 91.108.103.124
dig +short NS invent-and-invest.com   →  ns1.dns-parking.com, ns2.dns-parking.com
dig +short MX invent-and-invest.com   →  mx1.hostinger.com, mx2.hostinger.com

The dns-parking.com nameservers are Hostinger's own, and the website's response headers included platform: hostinger. The page code showed an off-the-shelf WordPress template, the kind that takes an afternoon to set up.

So one company was the registrar, the DNS host, the web host and the email provider. That is the best possible result, because a single abuse report can reach all four.

Step 3: report it to the host

Then tell the host, clearly and with proof. Abuse teams get floods of vague complaints. A report that gets acted on is short, factual and checkable in a couple of minutes. Ours contained:

  • the genuine company name, number and a link to its Companies House record
  • the fake domain and the exact pages showing our details and my name
  • the incident in Poland, in two sentences
  • the registrar, nameservers, mail servers and headers showing it was all Hostinger
  • the evidence PDFs attached, with the capture time and the SHA-256 manifest
  • a specific request: suspend the hosting, suspend the email accounts, lock the domain, and preserve the customer's account, payment, access and email logs, in case the police or another authority ever asked for them

That last point is easy to forget. Once the account is suspended, the logs showing who paid for it and where they logged in from are what an investigation needs, and hosts do not keep them for ever.

We sent it to the abuse address from the RDAP record on 29 September. On 30 September Hostinger confirmed it had reviewed the report and suspended the service. The registry has shown the domain as client hold ever since, which takes it out of the internet's address book: the website and the email both stopped working.

We also reported the site to Google, twice: through its Safe Browsing form for reporting phishing and scam sites, and through its legal removal request for content that impersonates a person or business. Suspending the hosting stops the site working, but the listing can sit in search results for a while, still showing our name next to the fake domain. Google removed it from its search results in about ten days.

Step 4: check your own domain

While checking everything, I looked at our own domain. inventandinvest.co.uk had passed its renewal date on 23 September, six days earlier, and was in Nominet's holding period. Nominet showed it as "Renewal required". Earlier in the year I had switched off automatic renewal on a batch of old domains I was letting go, and this one was on the list. Nominet would not let us change any of its settings until it was renewed. I renewed it that day, until September 2028, and then switched automatic renewal back on.

Nobody else could have taken it straight away. A .uk domain that passes its renewal date goes into a holding period: it keeps working for 30 days, is then suspended, and is only cancelled and released for anyone to register after about 90 days. Only the owner can renew it in that time, and ours was six days in. If it had run to the end of that period, anyone could have registered it.

Step 5: make the genuine site say clearly what is true

The genuine home page now says in plain words that we do not make investments, do not take money for investment, and that anyone contacting you claiming to invest on our behalf is not us. We also added structured data, a small block of code that search engines read, linking the website to the company number and its Companies House record.

Show the code
{
  "@context": "https://schema.org",
  "@type": "Organization",
  "name": "INVENT AND INVEST",
  "url": "https://www.inventandinvest.co.uk/",
  "foundingDate": "2001-07-17",
  "identifier": {"@type": "PropertyValue",
    "propertyID": "Companies House company number", "value": "04253863"},
  "sameAs": ["https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/04253863"]
}

Then we verified the domain in Google Search Console. This matters more than it used to. That evening the fake was the top result for our name, and Google's AI answer described "Invent And Invest" as a Warrington investment firm, using the fake site as its source. AI summaries repeat whatever ranks, so the genuine site needs to say the true version explicitly.

Step 6: a warning on a second site

I also run a consumer scam warning site, SafeFromScams, so in the interests of openness: it is connected to me. It published a factual warning about invent-and-invest.com the same evening, checked against both sites and Companies House, with the fake domain in plain text and no link. By later that evening, a search for the fake domain brought up a Google AI answer headed "Scam Alert" that quoted it. A second page, on a different site, gives search engines and AI summaries something to set against the fake one.

Your situation may be slightly different. ask a question below ↓ and our editorial team will reply with our advice.

Step 7: the phone calls

Then the phone started ringing. We had calls from people who said they were victims of the fake firm. Some of them may well have been. But we had no way of telling, and a call from a "victim" is also a handy way for a scammer to find out how you answer the phone, who works for you, what you know and what you are doing about it. Anyone who has lost money is also a target for a second scam offering to get it back.

So we were careful about what we said, never gave out details about the company or ourselves, and in the end we stopped answering Polish phone numbers altogether. If you are in the same position, keep a simple log of each call (date, number, what they said) and do not get drawn into the story.

We did not make a police report. When I looked at the online reporting form, it wanted the details of a crime: what had been lost, how and when. We had none to give. Nobody had told us they had lost money, and the people behind the fake firm seemed to be operating from Poland, so there was nothing a UK report could usefully say beyond what we had already sent the host.

If you find a fake or scam website, you do not need a crime or a loss to report it. The National Cyber Security Centre has a form for reporting suspicious websites, and it can have them taken down. If someone has lost money, that goes to Report Fraud.

What happens next

The fake domain's registration runs until 27 December 2026. When it lapses it goes through the registry's normal deletion cycle, and then anyone can register it again, including the same people. So the warnings stay up, partly for that reason and partly because anyone contacted before the suspension may still have their emails, phone numbers and documents.

What I would set up if I were you

  • Automatic renewal on every domain that matters, and a yearly check of the list. Ours went past its renewal date because of a bulk change I made myself.
  • A watch on lookalike domains. Search now and again for the obvious variants of your web address (with hyphens, .com, .uk, .net). If you have someone technical, a short weekly script using dig can tell you when one goes live, and crt.sh lists every new security certificate issued for a name, which a scam site almost always gets.
  • Register the cheapest lookalikes yourself. All this took was two hyphens and a .com.
  • SPF, DKIM and DMARC on your real domain. They stop criminals sending email that appears to come from your actual address. They cannot touch a lookalike domain, so you need the watch as well. See how we set them up on Microsoft 365.
  • A plain "what we do not do" statement on your site, such as "we never change bank details by email" or "we do not offer investments".
  • If it happens: save, trace, report. Save dated copies of everything, find out who registers and hosts the site, then send them a short report with the evidence attached. Ours took a day.

The lesson underneath it is the same one as in most fraud: details that look official prove nothing, and the only safe check is one you make yourself using contact details you found independently. If someone asks you to pay a new bank account, our article on fake invoices and bank detail scams covers the rule we use.